Identifying biomarkers of developing mental disorder is crucial to improving early identification and treatment—a key strategy for reducing the burden of mental disorders. Cross-frequency coupling between two different frequencies of neural oscillations is one such promising measure, believed to reflect synchronization between local and global networks in the brain. Specifically, in adults phase–amplitude coupling (PAC) has been shown to be involved in a range of cognitive processes, including working and long-term memory, attention, language, and fluid intelligence. Evidence suggests that increased (...) PAC mediates both temporary and lasting improvements in working memory elicited by transcranial direct-current stimulation and reductions in depressive symptoms after transcranial magnetic stimulation. Moreover, research has shown that abnormal patterns of PAC are associated with depression and schizophrenia in adults. PAC is believed to be closely related to cortico-cortico white matter (WM) microstructure, which is well established in the literature as a structural mechanism underlying mental health. Some cognitive findings have been replicated in adolescents and abnormal patterns of PAC have also been linked to ADHD in young people. However, currently most research has focused on cross-sectional adult samples. Whereas initial hypotheses suggested that PAC was a state-based measure due to an early focus on cognitive, task-based research, current evidence suggests that PAC has both state-based and stable components. Future longitudinal research focusing on PAC throughout adolescent development could further our understanding of the relationship between mental health and cognition and facilitate the development of new methods for the identification and treatment of youth mental health. (shrink)

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des (...) Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

This dissertation analyzes the three main philosophical movements which informed the intellectual world of Paul and his Greco-Roman contemporaries during the 1st century B.C.E. through the 2nd century C.E. In Part I, I analyze the moral transformation systems of the Middle Platonists , Neo-Stoics , and Greco-Roman Epicureans . I pay attention to the language of power in the analyses of Chapters 1--3, and to how power plays a salient role in philosophical discussions on the passions and on their (...) role in moral progress. What emerges from Part I are the following main conclusions: Despite the very different conceptualizations of the passions in Platonism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism, all three schools nonetheless viewed desire as a form of power and self-mastery over them as an expression of the sage's power. The power of the philosopher was the power of sight. That is, the sage saw himself and his potential errors correctly; and the sage saw the moral standard according to which one should conform. ;Part II is an attempt to show how a study of ancient philosophy of mind can help inform our understanding of Paul's letter recipients and Paul himself. The test case is the situation at Roman Corinth. Of all the philosophies of mind discussed in Part I, I make the initial case that the ideological framework which best explains the attitudes of the Corinthian strong over such issues such as sex with prostitutes is Epicurean philosophy and their ethics of the stomach. Sex is a natural desire and so is permissible in their moral framework. Finally, Chapter 5 examines extensively the external evidence for an Epicurean movement in the city of Roman Corinth. It makes the case for the presence of Epicurean converts among Corinth's urban leadership who, as immigrants, moved to Corinth from neighboring Greek cities and from Rome itself when Corinth was refound as a Roman colony in 44 B.C.E. The greatest epigraphic evidence for Corinthian Epicureans are the inscriptions dedicated to Junia Theodora and Gallio. (shrink)

L'épistocratie est un idéal de gouvernement au sein duquel le pouvoir est confié aux savants, même s'il n'est pas formellement reconnu dans la typologie classique des régimes constitutionnels. Il existe pourtant, depuis longtemps, en amont des décisions politiques, de nombreux comités d'experts qui livrent leur éclairage dans de multiples domaines qu'ils soient juridique, économique ou climatologique. La crise mondiale liée à l'épidémie de Covid-19, pendant laquelle les experts du monde médical ont été mobilisés par les gouvernants, a jeté une lumière (...) crue sur cette association entre le pouvoir et la science. Au-delà de cet exemple, l'ouvrage revient sur les analyses de Max Weber qui préconisait, dans ses conférences munichoises de 1917 et 1919, l'étanche séparation entre le savant et le politique. Il analyse les bénéfices attendus et les risques potentiels, pour la démocratie, de leur étroit rapprochement. (shrink)

The discussion “scientism vs. dialectic” centers around the problem of value-judgements since Max Weber.Scientism holds the thesis that in all scholarly disciplines (whether politics, economics, law or the sciences) the value-free methods of the sciences should be followed. The dialectical scholars, following Kant, Hegel and Marx claim on the other hand the primacy of practical reason, i.e. that reason can (and should) justify norms. After an historical introduction into the controversy, this lecture sketches how the dialectical thesis can be proven. (...) The new approach consists in a critical reconstruction ofall the words relevant for the discussion, beginning with such ethical modalities as “obligatory,” “permissible.” With these words we judge about aims: the judgements are norms of the form, e.g., “Under the condition C, the aim A is obligatory” (in Symbols: C Δ A).The task in practical reason is to justify such norms. Practical philosophy has to provide the basic vocabulary and the principles of justification. It starts with basic terms of the philosophy of mind as “wanting” and “willing.” The teaching method has to be described without using these words. (For all details cf.Normative Logic and Ethics, B.J. Mannheim, 1969.) In the same sense as “true” opinions are the result of reasonable discussions in which all participants try to overcome (“transcend”) their merely subjective opinions, it is the result of “transsubjective” argumentation whether in a certain situation an aim is (morally) required or forbidden. This categorical imperative of transcending all mere subjectivity is a “formal” principle for justifying norms. Material norms are justifiable only by investigating the genesis of the cultural situation in which they are applied. This leads, in a critical reconstruction of a method of Hegel (especially in his “philosophy or right”), to the formulation of a “dialectical” method as a spiral movement from factual geneses to normative geneses.By this method philosophy does not prescribe any “values” but prescribes how the cultural sciences should proceed in establishing material norms. (shrink)

In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...) notes taken at a lecture by Jeff erson, are edited and commented for the fi rst time. Th e originals are in the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago. Th e introduction highlights elements of the debate that included neurophysiology, mathematics, the mind-body-machine problem, and consciousness and shows that Turing’s approach, as documented here, does not lend itself to reductionism. (shrink)

Im Jahr 1900 entdeckte Max Planck die Quanten, die das vorherrschende Modell der klassischen Natur radikal in Frage stellten. Doch seit mehr als einhundert Jahren besteht ein Interpretationsdesaster, weil an der Dominanz des klassischen Modells der Natur nicht gezweifelt wird. Schuld daran ist in erheblichem Maße Albert Einstein. Dennoch hat er wie kein anderer die konträren Paradigmen der Natur auf den Begriff gebracht. Nimmt man ihn beim Wort und tauscht wider seinen Intentionen in einem revolutionären Akt die beiden Paradigmen in (...) ihren Verhältnissen aus, stellt also die Quantenwirklichkeit über die klassische Wirklichkeit, verschwinden alle Interpretationsprobleme. Die quantische Natur versinkt nicht mehr in Verrücktheiten, sondern erweist sich im Sinne des Philosophen Kant als vernünftig. In der Evolution des Lebens erscheint sie zudem als quantisches Denken. Da es das klassische Denken negiert, erscheint das quantische Denken in seiner Verletzung der Griceschen Maximen zudem als fiktional und schön. Hierzu hat uns Friedrich Schiller eine Vernunftsphilosophie der Freiheit als Schönheit in der Erscheinung angeboten. Als solche erscheint damit in Konsequenz die Quantenwirklichkeit. Sie ist nicht nur vernünftig, sondern auch schön und garantiert Freiheit. Das klassische Paradigma, par ordre de mufti als universal postuliert, garantiert dagegen hässliche und unvernünftige Unfreiheit, am deutlichsten artikuliert im Laplaceschen Dämon und in seinem Allmachtsanspruch im Verbund mit Leviathan. Höchste Zeit, sich aus dieser klassischen Unmündigkeit zu befreien. Dazu reicht es aus, das klassische Paradigma in das Quantenparadigma einzuordnen. Das vorliegende Buch über die vernünftigen und schönen Quanten kann dabei behilflich sein. (shrink)

According to Max Weber, the “fate of our times” is characterized by a “disenchantment of the world.” The scientific ambition of rationalization and intellectualization, as well as the attempt to master nature through technology, will greatly limit experiences of and openness for the transcendent, i.e. that which is beyond our control. Insofar as transcendence is a central aspect of virtually every religion and all religious experiences, the development of science and technology will, according to the Weberian assertion, also limit the (...) scope of religion. In this paper, we will reflect on the relations between technology and transcendence from the perspective of technological mediation theory. We will show that the fact that we are able to technologically intervene in the world and ourselves does not imply that we can completely control the rules of life. Technological interference in nature is only possible if the structures and laws that enable us to do that are recognized and to a certain extent obeyed, which indicates that technological power cannot exist without accepting a transcendent order in which one operates. Rather than excluding transcendence, technology mediates our relation to it. (shrink)

Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? In this chapter we apply this argument to beliefs in three different domains: morality, religion, and science. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. The simplest reply to evolutionary scepticism is that the truth of beliefs (...) in a certain domain is, in fact, connected to evolutionary success, so that evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in that domain. We call a connection between truth and evolutionary success a ‘Milvian bridge’, after the tradition which ascribes the triumph of Christianity at the battle of the Milvian bridge to the truth of Christianity. We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary scepticism, which has been used defend moral beliefs, is to argue that their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of affairs. We ask if this reply could be used to defend religious beliefs. (shrink)

In questo contributo del 2008 si dimostra, attraverso un confronto con le posizioni di Max Scheler, che Alsberg con il disimpegno corporeo (Körperausschaltung) non mira a esonerare l’organismo (nel senso della Entlastung di Gehlen). Per Alsberg l’evoluzione sociale avviene attraverso utensili, ma l’utensile non si limita a essere un’appendice del corpo, bensì rappresenta una logica estranea a quella del corpo. La Körperausschaltung è il killer del corpo. L’errore di Spencer è quello di non comprendere che un’evoluzione basata su utensili non (...) è semplicemente “sovra-organica”, ma piuttosto “extraorganica”. Extra-organico per Alsberg significa che l’utensile è al di fuori della logica del corpo. Ed è proprio l’autonomia dell’utensile dalla biologia a permettere di risolvere il paradosso della duplicità costitutiva dell’uomo: l’essere il motore di un’evoluzione extra-organica che produce contemporaneamente involuzione organica. Il “disimpegno organico” che libera l’uomo dal bisogno è possibile solo perché il problema dell’adattamento e dell’evoluzione viene spostato sul piano extra-organico: tale spostamento è ciò che contraddistingue l’uomo da tutti gli altri esseri viventi, quindi il principio costitutivo dell’esser umano. L' Ausschaltung, come disattivazione del corpo (dal verbo tedesco auschalten, nel senso di spegnere, ad es. una macchina, la luce ecc.) diventa pertanto il principio ultimo per comprendere l'umano nella sua interezza e non solo l'uomo della modernità (l'homo faber). L'eccezionale testo di Alsberg rimarrà praticamente sconosciuto, tuttavia con eccezioni di rilievo: già negli anni '20 ha un impatto decisivo su Max Scheler e sul progetto di fondazione dell'antropologia filosofica. Successivamente, ma con esiti opposti, su Gehlen. Il concetto di Körperausschaltung viene ripreso anche da Dieter Claessens, da Hans Blumenberg e infine da Sloterdijk. (shrink)

There has been relatively little debate about Nietzsche’s place in environmental ethics, but the lines of the debate are well marked. He has been viewed as an anthropocentrist by Michael E. Zimmerman, a humanist by Ralph Acampora, a biocentrist and deep ecolo­gist by Max Hallman, a constructivist by Martin Drenthen, and an ecocentrist by Graham Parkes. Nietzsche does provide a theory of intrinsic value and his philosophy of nature is germane to an environmerntal ethic. His philosophical biology grounds his value (...) theory. The secondary literature contains three main claims plaguing the debate about his views. First, commentators tend to ignore or downplay Nietzsche’s biology. Second, his value theory is not adequatey addressed. Third, does Nietzsche’s emphasis on hierarchy enable him to maintain that human life is more valuable than that of other life forms, but that the lower life forms have a different kind of value insofar as they enable and support higher life forms? This view is roughly parallel in many respects to the views of Paul Taylor, David Ray Griffin, and Michael E. Zimmerman. (shrink)

Acknowledgments T HOMAS CARLYLE MIGHT HAVE HAD MANY CURMUDGEONLY QUALITIES, but this certainly does not extend to the scholars who research him. ...

Paul E. Griffiths argues that most research on the emotions has been as misguided as Aristotelian efforts to study "superlunary objects" - objects...

The following statement is a report of the Committee on Philosophy in Education of the American Philosophical Association and was approved by the Association's Board of Officers in September, 1959. The Committee was composed of the following: C. W. Hendel, Chairman, H. G. Alexander, R. M. Chisholm, Max Fisch, Lucius Garvin, Douglas Morgan, A. E. Murphy, Charner Perry, and R. G. Turnbull. Primary responsibility for the preparation of this report belonged to a subcommittee composed of Roderick M. Chisholm, Chairman, H. (...) G. Alexander, Lewis Hahn, Paul C. Hayner, and Charles W. Hendel. (shrink)

It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...) of the adaptive responses is innate, the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt. The circuits subserving the adaptive responses are probably located in the limbic system. This theory of emotion is directly applicable only to a small sub-domain of the traditional realm of emotion. It can be used, however, to explain the grouping of various other phenomena under the heading of emotion, and to explain various characteristic failings of the pre-scientific conception of emotion. (shrink)

This chapter is intended to provide the reader with a brief biographical overview of Adorno's life and thought, with an emphasis on the key turning points in his career. It discusses his childhood, his education in Frankfurt, his musical studies, his emigration first to Oxford and then to the United States, his return to Germany after the Second World War, his tenure as professor at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt and his prominence as a public intellectual, and his confrontation with students. (...) Together with biographical details the chapter also offers a simple overview of Adorno's major concerns as a philosopher. (shrink)

Kenneth C. Schaffner's paper is an important contribution to the literature on behavioral genetics and on genetics in general. Schaffner has a long record of injecting real molecular biology into philosophical discussions of genetics. His treatments of the reduction of Mendelian to molecular genetics first drew philosophical attention to the problems of detail that have fuelled both anti-reductionism and more sophisticated models of theory reduction. An injection of molecular detail into discussions of genetics is particularly necessary at the present time, (...) when so many philosophers seem happy to discuss the philosophical and ethical implications of molecular biology using gene concepts derived from evolutionary biology ). Schaffner has long advocated the view that the philosophy of biology should be more than the philosophy of evolution. This paper shows how radically a picture of gene action derived from molecular biology undercuts the popular picture associated with a more evolutionary view of genes as units of heredity or as ‘difference-makers’ mediated by the ‘black box’ of development. (shrink)

In behavioral ecology some authors regard the innateness concept as irretrievably confused whilst others take it to refer to adaptations. In cognitive psychology, however, whether traits are 'innate' is regarded as a significant question and is often the subject of heated debate. Several philosophers have tried to define innateness with the intention of making sense of its use in cognitive psychology. In contrast, I argue that the concept is irretrievably confused. The vernacular innateness concept represents a key aspect of 'folkbiology', (...) namely, the explanatory strategy that psychologists and cognitive anthropologists have labeled 'folk essentialism'. Folk essentialism is inimical to Darwinism, and both Darwin and the founders of the modern synthesis struggled to overcome this way of thinking about living systems. Because the vernacular concept of innateness is part of folkbiology, attempts to define it more adequately are unlikely to succeed, making it preferable to introduce new, neutral terms for the various, related notions that are needed to understand cognitive development. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that causes differ in the degree to which they are ‘specific’ to their effects. Woodward has used this idea to enrich his influential interventionist theory of causal explanation. Here we propose a way to measure causal specificity using tools from information theory. We show that the specificity of a causal variable is not well-defined without a probability distribution over the states of that variable. We demonstrate the tractability and interest of our proposed measure by measuring the (...) specificity of coding DNA and other factors in a simple model of the production of mRNA. (shrink)

A number of philosophers and ‘evolutionary psychologists’ have argued that attacks on adaptationism in contemporary biology are misguided. These thinkers identify anti-adaptationism with advocacy of non-adaptive modes of explanation. They overlook the influence of anti-adaptationism in the development of more rigorous forms of adaptive explanation. Many biologists who reject adaptationism do not reject Darwinism. Instead, they have pioneered the contemporary historical turn in the study of adaptation. One real issue which remains unresolved amongst these methodological advances is the nature of (...) ‘phylogenetic inertia’. To what extent is an adaptive explanation needed for the persistence of a trait as well as its origin? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.2 (2001) 177-178 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution. Mara Beller. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999. Pp. xv + 365. $35.00 cloth. This book presents a critical discussion of the development of quantum physics in the early part of the second quarter of the twentieth century. The opening statement of the (...) first chapter, a quotation attributed to Werner Heisenberg--"Science is rooted in conversations"--sets the tone for the whole book.The book is divided into two parts: "Dialogical Emergence" and "Rhetorical Consolidation." An introductory chapter, "Novelty and Dogma," outlines what is new for quantum theory as compared with what is already accepted in physics. Another six chapters build upon the various relationships between the people and ideas that led ultimately to the acceptance of a number of principles to explain a large variety of physical phenomena at the atomic level. The next six chapters generally show how a vocal group of scientists put forward the "Copenhagen Interpretation"; these scientists used the rhetorical skills of Niels Bohr and often unjustly criticized other views significant to the development of quantum mechanics. The final two chapters relate to later philosophical and historical implications of the development of quantum theory as discussed by the scientists themselves, as well as philosophers and historians of science, including the author.Mara Beller carries out a rather unique discussion of the scientific ideas and the social relationships among the scientists. She has carefully studied many of the original letters between the leading scientists at the time--Niels Bohr, Max Born, Paul Dirac, Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli, Erwin Schrodinger--and numerous others who were not so well known. In particular, she discusses how these scientists influenced each other. A prime example is carefully developed in the early chapters of the book, where Beller discusses Heisenberg's work on matrix mechanics. After Heisenberg learned of Schrodinger's wave mechanics, he strongly denied the use of this rival method. As a result of discussions with [End Page 177] Bohr, Pauli, and others, however, many elements of wave mechanics began to appear in matrix mechanics in somewhat hidden forms. As quantum theory evolved in the following years, aspects of both wave mechanics and matrix mechanics came together in complementarity, due largely to the influence of Bohr. Yet, Beller questions, in the second part of the book, whether much of the process of assimilation by Bohr was one sided, so that the Copenhagen interpretation always came out the stronger.This book has scientific merit for both students and professionals in the physical sciences. During the intervening three quarters of a century since the founding years of quantum mechanics, many fundamental ideas have come to be accepted as basic concepts in chemistry, physics, material science, and related fields in engineering. In fact, the acceptance of the usefulness of quantum mechanics is so strong that many of ideas are seen as an integral part of the field itself, to the point that the proceeding concepts in early quantum theory are often neglected. This situation is rather unfortunate. It arises in part from the contemporary educational system, in which only the most immediate examples relevant to a particular field are used. The discussions in this book bring forward a completely different side of the development of quantum theory, which in many ways continues right up to the present. Here, the philosophical and social sides are stressed over the practical applications. Above and beyond this strength, the presentation could be understood by many people outside the physical sciences even though many of the scientific objectives may not be so very apparent. Quantum Dialogue is recommended to all readers who have an interest in the issues that arose during the early years of quantum theory's development. David E. Miller Department of Physics The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

The historian Raphael Falk has described the gene as a ‘concept in tension’ (Falk 2000) – an idea pulled this way and that by the differing demands of different kinds of biological work. Several authors have suggested that in the light of contemporary molecular biology ‘gene’ is no more than a handy term which acquires a specific meaning only in a specific scientific context in which it occurs. Hence the best way to answer the question ‘what is a gene’, and (...) the only way to provide a truly philosophical answer to that question is to outline the diversity of conceptions of the gene and the reasons for this diversity. In this essay we draw on the extensive literature in the history of biology to explain how the concept has changed over time in response to the changing demands of the biosciences . Finally, we outline some of the conceptions of the gene current today. The seeds of change are implicit in many of those current conceptions and the future of the gene concept looks set to be at as turbulent as the past. (shrink)

Darwinists classify biological traits either by their ancestry (homology) or by their adaptive role. Only the latter can provide traditional natural kinds, but only the former is practicable. Process structuralists exploit this embarrassment to argue for non-Darwinian classifications in terms of underlying developmental mechanisms. This new taxonomy will also explain phylogenetic inertia and developmental constraint. I argue that Darwinian homologies are natural kinds despite having historical essences and being spatio-temporally restricted. Furthermore, process structuralist explanations of biological form require an unwarranted (...) assumption about the space of developmental possibility. (shrink)

Genetic determinism is the idea that many significant human characteristics are rendered inevitable by the presence of certain genes. The psychologist Susan Oyama has famously compared arguing against genetic determinism to battling the undead. Oyama suggests that genetic determinism is inherent in the way we currently represent genes and what genes do. As long as genes are represented as containing information about how the organism will develop, they will continue to be regarded as determining causes no matter how much evidence (...) exists to the contrary. Philip Kitcher has strongly disputed Oyama’s diagnosis, arguing that the conventional ‘interactionist’ perspective on development is the correct framework for understanding the role of the genes in development. While acknowledging the legitimacy of many of Kitcher’s observations, I believe that Oyama’s view is substantially correct. In this paper I provide several lines of support for support the Oyama diagnosis. (shrink)

The etiological approach to ‘proper functions’ in biology can be strengthened by relating it to Robert Cummins' general treatment of function ascription. The proper functions of a biological trait are the functions it is assigned in a Cummins-style functional explanation of the fitness of ancestors. These functions figure in selective explanations of the trait. It is also argued that some recent etiological theories include inaccurate accounts of selective explanation in biology. Finally, a generalization of the notion of selective explanation allows (...) an analysis of the proper functions of human artifacts. (shrink)

Many of the most important properties of human groups – including properties that may give one group an evolutionary advantage over another – are properly defined only at the level of group organization. Yet at present, most work on the evolution of culture has focused solely on the transmission of individual-level traits. I propose a conceptual extension of the theory of cultural evolution, particularly related to the evolutionary competition between cultural groups. The key concept in this extension is the emergent (...) group-level trait. This type of trait is characterized by the structured organization of differentiated individuals and constitutes a unit of selection that is qualitatively different from selection on groups as defined by traditional multilevel selection theory. As a corollary, I argue that the traditional focus on cooperation as the defining feature of human societies has missed an essential feature of cooperative groups. Traditional models of cooperation assume that interacting with one cooperator is equivalent to interacting with any other. However, human groups involve differential roles, meaning that receiving aid from one individual is often preferred to receiving aid from another. In this target article, I discuss the emergence and evolution of group-level traits and the implications for the theory of cultural evolution, including ramifications for the evolution of human cooperation, technology, and cultural institutions, and for the equivalency of multilevel selection and inclusive fitness approaches. (shrink)

Heyes’ book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.

In a recent article in this journal, Zachary Ardern criticizes our view that the most promising candidate for a naturalized criterion of disease is the "selected effects" account of biological function and dysfunction. Here we reply to Ardern’s criticisms and, more generally, clarify the relationship between adaptation and dysfunction in the evolution of health and disease.

This chapter analyzes the notion of human nature and the concept of inner nature from the perspective of developmental systems theory. It explores the folkbiology of human nature and looks at three features associated with traits that are expressions of the inner nature that organisms inherit from their parents: fixity, typicality, teleology.

This article discusses a serious problem in the way ethics is taught in journalism and mass communication programs. The study is based, in part, on a survey of 359 students who have had varied exposure to university journalism programs. The survey consisted of 87 questions that provided information on the demographics of the participants as well as an opportunity to respond to a series of 25 hypothetical ethical dilemmas. Results indicate that although respondents found most of the hypothetical situations to (...) be ethics violations, they often did not recognize the seriousness of the violations and did not know what to do when faced with those violations. (shrink)

The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative extended replicator approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). A precise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the life-cycle that DST claims is the unit of evolution. Pacé Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an extended replicator on Sterelny et al.s definition. Reasons are given (...) for scepticism about the heuristic value claimed for the extended replicator concept. For every competitive, individualistic insight the replicator theorist has a cooperative, systematic blindspot. (shrink)

Donation after cardiac death (DCD) is associated with many problems, including ischemic injury, high rates of delayed allograft function, and frequent organ discard. Furthermore, many potential DCD donors fail to progress to asystole in a manner that would enable safe organ transplantation and no organs are recovered. DCD protocols are based upon the principle that the donor must be declared dead prior to organ recovery. A new protocol is proposed whereby after a donor family agrees to withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, (...) premortem nephrectomy is performed in advance of end-of-life management. Since nephrectomy should not cause the donor's death, this approach satisfies the dead donor rule. The donor family's wishes are best met by organ donation, successful outcomes for the recipients, and a dignified death for the deceased. This proposal improves the likelihood of achieving these objectives. (shrink)

Some ‘naturalist’ accounts of disease employ a biostatistical account of dysfunction, whilst others use a ‘selected effect’ account. Several recent authors have argued that the biostatistical account offers the best hope for a naturalist account of disease. We show that the selected effect account survives the criticisms levelled by these authors relatively unscathed, and has significant advantages over the BST. Moreover, unlike the BST, it has a strong theoretical rationale and can provide substantive reasons to decide difficult cases. This is (...) illustrated by showing how life-history theory clarifies the status of so-called diseases of old age. The selected effect account of function deserves a more prominent place in the philosophy of medicine than it currently occupies. _1_ Introduction _2_ Biostatistical and Selected Effect Accounts of Function _3_ Objections to the Selected Effect Account _3.1_ Boorse _3.2_ Kingma _3.3_ Hausman _3.4_ Murphy and Woolfolk _4_ Problems for the Biostatistical Account _4.1_ Schwartz _5_ Analysis versus Explication _6_ Explicating Dysfunction: Life History Theory and Senescence _7_ Conclusion. (shrink)

Throughout his career David Hull has sought to bring the philosophy of science into closer contact with science and especially with biological science (Hull 1969, 1997b). This effort has taken many forms. Sometimes it has meant ‘either explaining basic biology to philosophers or explaining basic philosophy to biologists’ (Hull 1996, p. 77). The first of these tasks, simple as it sounds, has been responsible for revolutionary changes. It is well known that traditional philosophy of science, modeled as it was on (...) theoretical physics, proved inadequate when philosophers turned their attention to biological science. Biological examples have driven major revisions of accounts of reduction (Hull 1974; Schaffner 1993, Ch. 9), laws of nature (Beatty et al. 1997), theories (Lloyd 1988) and natural kinds (Wilson 1999, Part III). Nor is explaining basic philosophy to biologists a task to be looked down upon. It is useful, not because philosophy has all the answers, but because scientists must think about how to do science, that is doing philosophy of science and scientists frequently reinvent philosophical views with known flaws. Early in his career Hull found biological systematists in the grip of a crude operationalism about scientific concepts and said so in the pages of Systematic Zoology (Hull 1968). For the next thirty years, as biologists debated the nature of species and the correct principles of classification, Hull added a philosophical note at the same congresses and in the same journals (Hull 1970, 1976, 1980, 1997a, 1999). (shrink)

The work presented here investigates the process by which one group of individuals solves the problem of detecting deceptions created by other agents. A field experiment was conducted in which twenty-four auditors (partners in international public accounting firms) were asked to review four cases describing real companies that, unknown to the auditors, had perpetrated financial frauds. While many of the auditors failed to detect the manipulations in the cases, a small number of auditors were consistently successful. Since the detection of (...) frauds occurs infrequently in the work of a given auditor, we explain success by the application of powerful heuristics gained from experience with deceptions in everyday life. These heuristics implement a variation of Dennett's intentional stance strategy, which is based on interpreting detected inconsistencies in the light of the Deceiver's (i.e., management's) goals and possible actions. We explain failure to detect deception by means of perturbations (bugs) in the domain knowledge of accounting needed to apply these heuristics to the specific context of financial statement fraud. We test our theory by showing that a computational model of fraud detection that employs the proposed heuristics successfully detects frauds in the cases given to the auditors. We then modify the model by introducing perturbations based on the errors made by each of the auditors in the four cases. The resulting models account for 84 of the 96 observations (i.e., 24 auditors × four cases) in our data. (shrink)

We outline three very different concepts of the gene—instrumental, nominal, and postgenomic. The instrumental gene has a critical role in the construction and interpretation of experiments in which the relationship between genotype and phenotype is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between nucleic acid molecules. It also plays an important theoretical role in the foundations of disciplines such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. The nominal gene is a critical practical tool, allowing stable communication between bioscientists in a wide (...) range of fields grounded in well-defined sequences of nucleotides, but this concept does not embody major theoretical insights into genome structure or function. The post-genomic gene embodies the continuing project of understanding how genome structure supports genome function, but with a deflationary picture of the gene as a structural unit. This final concept of the gene poses a significant challenge to conventional assumptions about the relationship between genome structure and function, and between genotype and phenotype. (shrink)

Human experts are the source of knowledge required to develop computer systems that perform at an expert level. Human beings are not, however, able to reliably express what they know. As a result, experts often develop non-authentic accounts of their own expertise. These accounts, here termed reconstructed methods of reasoning, lead to computer systems that perform at a high level of proficiency but have the disadvantage that they often do not reflect the heuristics and processing constraints of a system user. (...) Reconstructed methods of reasoning are compared with authentic methods derived from the study of expert human behavior. Tests are proposed to establish the authenticity of reasoning methods and examples from medical diagnosis are used to illustrate how authentic methods of reasoning can be incorporated into an expert computer system. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not `natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by `natural kind', suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories.